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Abstract 
What interpretation of human flourishing, what ideas of value, does capitalism 
in practice embody and promote? To address this question the paper clarifies 
first that ‘capitalism’ must be understood as more than merely a system of 
private property and markets. It contains ‘the prerogative of capital’, in which 
surplus remains with the owners of capital, and ‘the perspective of capital’, in 
which hired work is defined as a cost. The question must also be distinguished 
from more conventional ones (Does capitalism promote human flourishing? Is 
capitalism desirable? Is capitalism better than the alternatives?). Capitalism may 
not fit very well any of the standard conceptions of well-being, as pleasure or 
satisfaction or fulfilment of substantive needs. Its unending drives for 
expansion of the supply of commodities, and for their recurrent replacement, 
seem to fit more closely with an activist conception of well-being. The 
preoccupation with levels of monetized activity arises as an effect of capitalist 
categories of social accounting, fanned by competition, and how they can 
channel deeper human motives and pre-capitalist forces. However, while 
capitalism overemphasises activity (as monetized throughput), it undervalues 
work (as human self-expression) despite its centrality for felt well-being and 
physical and mental health and capability. The typical conception of work 
under capitalism is as a cost, for the capitalist must pay for it. The activist 
strand in capitalist practice and in corners of capitalist theory compensates to 
some extent for the automatic presumption that work is a cost, but in 
distorted, accidental and incomplete fashion. The paper concludes by asking 
how alternative conceptualizations of work might contribute to a more 
adequate treatment of human flourishing, and how we might draw implications 
from the well-being literature for reconceptualisation of work, reform of 
categories of societal accounting, and deepening of the research on ‘human 
development’. 
Keywords 
Capitalism; market system; well-being; social accounting; work; ‘the strenuous 
life’ 
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Capitalism and Human Flourishing?  
The strange story of the bias to activity and the downgrading 
of work 1 
1 Clarifying and distinguishing the debates 
What sort of conception of human flourishing does capitalism promote? This 
question is less familiar than its popular sister: Does capitalism promote human 
flourishing?, and also less popular than: Is capitalism desirable?, and than the 
policy variant: Is capitalism better than the alternatives? Those last two 
questions are bigger than the questions about human flourishing, because 
human flourishing is not the only relevant evaluation criterion. 
Deirdre McCloskey’s recent book and grand project on The Bourgeois 
Virtues ask whether capitalism is desirable, in process and in outcome. In this 
opening book in her series she primarily considers: What are the virtues? And 
does capitalist society recognise, practice and promote them? But her overall 
destination, she declares at the outset, is a vindication that capitalist society, 
indeed specifically American capitalist society, is desirable. In contrast, my 
main question in this paper is: what ideas of the desirable do the real practice 
of capitalism represent and encourage?  
Most discussion on the relationships between capitalism and human 
flourishing concerns capitalism as a means, an instrument. It considers how 
efficacious or not the instrument is, with respect to some conception or 
conceptions of human flourishing. Peter Saunders (1995), for example, 
measures capitalism against Abraham Maslow’s posited fundamental human 
needs. As we will see in the second section of the paper, the existing defences 
of capitalism are in terms of its instrumentality for far more than economic 
growth. It is also defended as being, amongst other things: a field of freedom; a 
forcing ground of innovation; a system for widespread opportunity for 
involvement in decision making and hence for the growth of skills, knowledge 
and experience; a mechanism to reward effort and creativity; and a stable basis 
for political democracy. A writer like McCloskey looks at a wide range of 
possible effects. Each of these lines of defence carries a potential for critical 
assessment too, and for motivating reform and redesign. Most of the lines of 
thought have implications also for the conceptions of human flourishing that 
are associated with capitalism.  
That last question has received less attention: what conception of human 
flourishing does capitalism promote? While multiple conceptions of flourishing 
may exist under capitalism—and sometimes claims are even made that 
capitalism provides space for whatever conception of flourishing people 
happen to hold—we should ask whether certain types of conception are 
promoted by capitalism and more in harmony with it, rather than simply able to 
                                                 
1 This paper is a revised version of a plenary address to the 12th World Congress for 
Social Economics, University of Amsterdam, June 7-9, 2007. My thanks go to John 
Davis and Ian Gough for careful commentary which helped to strengthen the 
arguments at several points. 
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co-exist with it. For with reference to conceptions of well-being as pleasure or 
satisfaction or fulfilment of substantive needs, the third section of the paper 
will suggest that capitalism does not fit any of them very well. Instead, its 
unending drives for expansion and destruction may fit an activist conception 
of well-being. The fourth section examines this further.  
Yet paradoxically, the typical conception of work under capitalism is as a 
cost, for the capitalist must pay for it. We should reflect on the categorization 
of costs and benefits under capitalism. There are fundamental implications of 
extending capitalist accounting categories from the level of the individual 
capitalist enterprise to that of an entire society. The highly questionable results 
which this extension produces in the case of discounting of future costs and 
benefits have been extensively discussed. The comparable extension of 
capitalist categories for the treatment of paid work time may produce major 
distortions in policy evaluation, given the considerable evidence that for many 
people work is one of the major sources of fulfilment. The paper’s fifth section 
raises this issue. It ends by asking how alternative conceptualizations of work 
might contribute to a more adequate treatment of human flourishing. 
I have framed the issues in terms of a pair of vast and vague general 
notions: capitalism and human flourishing. I should explain why, and what I 
mean by them. 
What is human flourishing? 
I have chosen to use the category of human flourishing, more than welfare or 
well-being, for two reasons. First, welfare and well-being are too easily seen as 
nouns, presumed unitary and ready for measurement, rather than as verbs; and 
they are thus, second, too readily subsumed into the utilitarian mindset of 
mainstream economics. 
Martha Nussbaum points out that while most 18th-20th century English 
translations of the classical concept of ‘eudaimonia’ reduced it to mean 
happiness, it refers to ‘a complete and flourishing human life’ (1997: 118-9), 
‘activity in accordance with excellence’ (2005: 175), ‘a specific plurality of 
valuable activities’ (2005: 171) that reflect our human specificity, including, not 
least, love and friendship. The term ‘human flourishing’ represents 
‘eudaimonia’ far more revealingly. While the concept of ‘well-being’ that has 
revived in the past generation is a great improvement over the notions of 
‘utility’ or ‘economic welfare’, it too is more prone to hypostatization than is 
the concept of human flourishing. Well-being should be conceived of as a 
verb, or a verb noun (gerund)—well-being—more than as a thing noun, in 
order to match the fluid, elusive and ongoing character of life. Life, the noun, 
really consists of living, the verb. As Nussbaum notes: ‘Most [ancient] Greeks 
would understand eudaimonia to be something essentially active, of which 
praiseworthy activities are not just productive means, but actual constituent 
parts’ (1986: 6). Pleasure was seen as ‘so closely linked to the relevant activities 
that it cannot be pursued on its own’ (2005: 176). 
Second, there is a danger that this well-being becomes thought of as a 
quantity of something relatively straightforward, that we can weigh or 
otherwise measure, a sum of mental money or some quasi-biological variable 
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that can be read-off by the appropriate technical apparatus. This is the path 
that was followed in reducing the concept of utility, perceived usefulness, into 
a concept of ophelimity (Pareto’s term), a supposed measure of satisfaction.2  I 
will still sometimes use the term ‘well-being’, which is standard now both in 
scientific and everyday language, but we should use ‘human flourishing’ when 
we need to emphasise that we are talking about processes of be-ing, as valued 
in processes of reflection and discussion, and not about quantities of a mental 
money nor some counterpart to mental temperature which we could 
adequately measure by deft use of a well-being thermometer (Gasper 2008). 
What is capitalism? 
The concept of capitalism contains various elements. Typically highlighted are: 
 First, the commodity form;   
 Second, the habitat for commodities, namely, markets (a system of 
resource allocation through buying and selling, using prices for monetized 
exchange); 
 Third, private property. 
Much discussion in the Weberian tradition concentrates on markets—
capitalism is ‘production for a market by enterprising individuals or combines 
with the purpose of making a profit’ (Berger 1987: 19)—not other features of 
capitalism. But markets are found also outside capitalist societies; as in market 
socialism, for example. Similarly, John Douglas Bishop’s survey of issues in the 
ethics of capitalism defines capitalism as the combination of private property 
and free markets (Bishop 2000: 4). This is problematic in both what it 
highlights and what it leaves out. The idea that capitalism by definition 
involves free markets—meaning that prices are determined in markets—implies 
that monopoly capitalism cannot exist. Adam Smith was more realistic, noting 
that nothing was more typical of capitalism than collusion to restrict free 
competition. Attempts to define capitalism by the freedom of markets lead to 
the exclusion of misdemeanours, by definition, as well as to diversion of 
attention from more central aspects. Thus in addition the definition does not 
go far enough. Essential to capitalism are two further features. 
 Fourth, particular forms of property and enterprise law and accounting 
practice, which assign all net surplus to the owners of capital. The default 
setting for the allocation of net surplus is that it goes to the capitalists, and 
not (also) to the workers or the community. We can call this ‘the 
prerogative of capital’ (see e.g. Ellerman 1973). 
This fourth feature, missing from Bishop’s characterization and even from the 
fuller one by Saunders (1995: 9), deserves special attention. The prerogative of 
capital takes us beyond merely private property, to distinctively capitalist 
property arrangements and categories and their implications. It is more 
fundamental than ‘the systematic and self-interested pursuit of profit’ 
(Saunders 1995: 5), for capitalism is still capitalism when pursuit of profit is 
half-hearted. Fundamental is the category of profit itself, seen as net earnings 
                                                 
2 See Fisher (1918), Cooter and Rappaport (1984). 
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to the enterprise owner, the capitalist, after payment for all other inputs, 
including for labour treated as merely a commodity. One of the implications 
can be called ‘the perspective of capital’, wherein work is presumed to be a cost 
and human flourishing becomes presumed to be measured by net present 
value. 
 Fifth, the combination of the first four features—markets, monetization, 
private property, the prerogative of capital—can gradually generate 
something more than the sum of the parts: stupendous accumulated 
holdings of capital, transferable monetized claims over resources, that 
constitute the greatest source of power in their societies and in the whole 
world. 
We can then note two further features: 
 Sixth, an apparatus of supportive systems (including of state power) that 
defend and extend the commodity form, private property, market 
transactions free from non-profit obligations, and the capitalist 
prerogative; and 
 Seventh, more broadly, the types of politics, culture and society that may 
be symbiotic with capitalist economy and its supportive apparatus. 
There is obviously not just one type of capitalist society. Capitalist societies are 
not totally integrated mega-systems with a unitary rationale. They contain far 
more than capitalism, even if we defined that to cover all the seven features 
above, not only the first five. Capitalist societies also contain families, religions, 
arts, sciences, other cultural forms (such as, typically, nationalism), and non-
capitalist elements of civil society in many fields. So we can distinguish: 
capitalist economic arrangements and activity, namely the first four features 
above, and their eventual product (the fifth feature); capitalist theory and 
ideology, which can differ from the actual behaviour, for example by 
downplaying the negative features; and capitalist societies, which include much 
more than just capitalist economy and capitalist theory. 
Mainstream economics emphasises only the first three features we alluded 
to: the circulation of commodities in a private property system of markets—
‘the market system’. McCloskey has a richer conceptualization of capitalism, 
yet one that is still fundamentally incomplete. She sees capitalism as ‘merely 
private property and free labor without central planning, regulated by the rule 
of law and by an ethical consensus’ (2006: 14). This touches on or implies most 
of the features we mentioned, but the definition has become moralized, as if 
there cannot be capitalism unregulated by the rule of law, such as we have seen 
in contemporary Russia and much of the global South. McCloskey does not 
consider that to be true capitalism. And, critically, her definition excludes the 
essential capitalist prerogative, or smuggles it in via particular interpretations of 
private property and free labor. Implicitly, ‘free labor’ here means labor as a 
commodity that is free from having a share in surplus. Towards the end of the 
book McCloskey provides a yet more reduced and idealized definition of 
capitalism, close to Bishop’s: ‘a market-oriented, free-trade, private property, 
enterprising, and energetic economy, [just as] in the Lower Galilee of Jesus’s 
time’ (p.462). In the relatively self-enclosed, abstracted, intellectual world of 
much market theory the same fundamental verities apply for all times (cf. 
McCloskey, end p.508). This sort of notion from neo-classical economic theory 
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is insufficient for thinking about 21st century forms of capitalism, in which the 
principles of commoditization, private property rights and the capitalist 
prerogative are being extended and modified in attempts like those to patent 
the neem leaf and the human genome, and in an international trade in 
trafficked persons and in human body parts.  
McCloskey’s definition of capitalism serves to insulate it from criticism. 
Problems are due to other systems—notably statism—and not due to 
capitalism; and/or they are due not to too much capitalism, but to too little. 
Thus McCloskey has little to say on the natural environment, except that: ‘The 
absence of property rights brought the ecological endangerment’ (2006: 32)—
not capitalism but the absence of capitalism. The capitalist system becomes 
judged by its results, except where they are bad, when it is said that the 
problem is not the system, but instead too little of it. Yet private property does 
not always lead to resource conservation; it can lead to resource-mining, with 
the profits then switched into other sectors. Elsewhere McCloskey urges us to 
understand and evaluate the system as a system, an overall culture that is 
reinforced by and reinforces its legal and economic arrangements; but 
sometimes it seems that we are required to close our eyes to the fact that the 
system is not only a set of abstracted textbook arrangements but a rich 
composite of consequences and causes. One such consequence is that property 
rights are often not yet introduced when the rich and rapacious think that they 
can get more for themselves individually by using their powers to seize wealth 
and privileges.  
Real capitalism cannot be discussed with all the disliked bits and 
interconnections left out – such as that an economic system requires a state, or 
that super wealth spreads and buys political power, or that rich producers 
inevitably seek to capture a regulatory apparatus. For McCloskey capitalist 
capture of the state is seen as part of statism, not capitalism (2006: 35); the 
supposed mistake is to have created a regulatory apparatus. Likewise for cases 
of the feeding of corporations with public money (p.44ff), even though these 
cases are driven by corporate power. McCloskey recognises that the robber 
barons ‘corrupted politics. But when have the rich not done so?’ (p.493). Her 
advice is to minimise the state apparatus that is available for them to corrupt 
and capture. Even the disastrous imposition of capitalist ideology on Africa in 
the 1980s and 90s spearheaded by the IMF and World Bank is presented by 
her as a failing of statism—the misdeeds of two intergovernmental 
organizations, not of capitalism.3 
We must keep in mind the dangers of essentializing capitalism, in 
whichever direction: as pure and timeless good, or pure and timeless evil. 
Capitalism has many operationalisations possible at a given time, and is 
additionally flexible over time. Consider for example the emergence of a 
‘shared capitalism’ in some corners, as described by Jeff Gates (1998). We need 
to think about possible potentials for the evolution and mutation of capitalist 
categories and practice, in more humane directions. 
                                                 
3 McCloskey’s comments on Africa at various points show considerable ignorance. 
(E.g.: ‘The Afrikaners of 1910 had no experience of work and no respect for it’ (p. 
471).) 
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2   Is Capitalism Desirable? 
Amongst mainstream economics arguments for capitalism—seen only as ‘the 
market system’, with the other features overlooked or tacitly assumed—come 
first the familiar pictures of markets as fine-tuned machines for making 
marginalist calculations about benefits and opportunity costs: the neo-
classical, equilibrium-focused, emphasis. We must of course here ask: whose 
benefits and costs? Markets are also then looked at as sensitive mechanisms 
which can go wrong in many ways. Second come the pictures of markets as 
eco-systems that are strong in generating learning, adaptation, and innovation: 
the longer-run emphasis given by the evolutionary and Austrian schools. I see 
overall a set of four conventional themes asserted in pro-market economics: 
1. markets as relatively efficient transmitters of information and incentives (but 
having significant transaction costs) 
2. markets as ways of mobilizing the energies and information of myriads of 
diverse agents in diverse situations across a whole economy, indeed the 
whole world 
3. markets as flexible adjusters to changes in conditions; and 
4. markets as efficient allocation mechanisms, a proposition that tacitly rests 
on the previous three features. 
Theme 4 has received the lion’s share of attention in academic economics 
textbooks, though they rarely adequately specify the assumptions required to 
sustain the conclusion that a market equilibrium is socially efficient (in some 
sense of the term). The assumptions concern the absence or unimportance of 
each of the following: externalities and ‘public goods’; (other) information 
failures (producers and consumers must be well-informed on the nature of 
products, on available present and future alternatives, on costs and benefits, 
etc.); and of monopoly power (prices and quantities must respond well to 
excess supply or demand). Required in addition are the absence or 
unimportance of incompetence or irrationality, and of improper interference 
with free exchange and price movements, whether by criminals or by the State. 
The potential failings of markets in terms of economic efficiency arise 
from the presence, to a significant degree, of one or more of the factors just 
listed. The potential failings concern also matters beyond economic efficiency: 
distributive equity and the acceptability of preferences. 
 Markets are liberal institutions in the sense that they allow anything to be 
bought and sold as long as that is not prohibited and prevented. For good 
and/or ill, markets have no views or guarantees about the content and 
outcomes of the process. Where consumer preferences are judged ethically 
unacceptable then so too will be market outcomes (consider, say, 
preferences for hurting other people, and in some cases, ironically, 
preferences about exactly how other people should live).  
 Distributive equity concerns a morally acceptable distribution of income, 
tasks, duties and risks. Markets only respect effective demand. Sen’s 
entitlements approach highlights the possibility of disastrous market 
outcomes—through to famine, starvation, and death—caused not by 
technical market failures but by the structural blindness of markets to 
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people without money, those who lack or lose sufficient money-backed 
title to benefits. In 2008 newspapers reported that some people in Haiti 
were reduced to filling their stomachs with ‘pies’ made from mud, as food 
prices had soared worldwide. 
These considerations lead us further beyond economic arguments, including to 
social and political themes such as that:  
 Markets are presented as avenues of free choice; thus whether or not the 
preferences pursued are considered good or not, their free pursuit is itself 
considered a good. The freedom argument for markets still applies to 
some extent even when agents are incompetent and irrational, within 
certain limits. Merely formal freedom is clearly insufficient, though, as Sen 
for one reminds us.  
 Markets are presented also as a decentralized way of organizing societal 
decision-making, in the sense that they do not require (a) consensus on 
societal objectives or (b) a central decision-making authority; thus, they 
offer allocation without a (centralised) allocator. In reality, the 
decentralization seen in modern capitalism is far from that in a dream of 
village-green democracy; it is the interaction of vastly diverse and mutually 
remote agents, some of them immensely resourced, some with almost 
nothing—the latter being free of resources, free of enforceable claims, and 
free of rights to a part of social surplus.  
Extending the purview of evaluation beyond economics arguments reveals that 
externalities concern also, and perhaps more importantly, matters of cultural and 
political side-effects. As we saw, market proponents claim that markets provide a 
multi-polar source of power independent of the State, which helps to 
counterbalance it. Market critics argue to the contrary that markets generate 
concentrations of wealth which can be converted in a commodity-based 
society into other types of power, via political campaign funds, bribery, 
‘favours’, threats, mass media ownership, selective funding of research and 
education, and so on (cf. Walzer 1983). Markets tend to spread, both because 
money often tries to buy other types of power, and because a market-mentality 
can spread. 
Similarly, market proponents stress that markets can and do build skills, 
independence, self-reliance and initiative, whereas market critics stress that 
uncontrolled markets do not promote altruism and community, and can in 
some circumstances undermine them, as seen currently in certain countries. By 
promoting narrowly self-interested behaviour and ignoring side-effects, 
markets can weaken institutions that keep societies coherent and humane (see 
e.g. Stretton & Orchard 1994). 
The entry on ‘market’ in the Oxford Dictionary of Sociology sums up that there 
are both political and economic arguments for and against markets. Table 1 
here provides an overview of such arguments.  
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TABLE 1 
 Political and economic arguments for and against markets 
 ASSERTED STRENGTHS ASSERTED WEAKNESSES 
POLITICAL Freedom  Freedom ‘to sleep under bridges’ is not 
enough.  
Free choice is not always wise or good 
choice. 
 Decentralization Great concentrations of wealth distort 
politics and administration, information 
generation, dissemination and 
interpretation, and opinion formation 
 Rewards effort and skill Private property system also rewards 
luck, and accidents of birth. It ignores 
some other aspects of equity. 
ECONOMIC Prices cheaply coordinate agents 
by transmitting information.... 
Information is not shared by all. 
 ... that reflects both supply 
conditions and demand conditions, 
the information needed for 
efficiency; 
Markets only use information of certain 
types, and only on things that can be 
related to money. They ignore external 
effects or respond to them in unreliable 
and inequitable ways, considered in the 
Coase theorem.  
 … and they provide incentives for 
effort, adjustment, and innovation. 
Competition and its rewards and 
penalties lead to concentration of 
economic power. 
 Markets allow and encourage 
specialization; …  
Markets can be risky and unstable [not 
least financial markets]. They leave 
many people vulnerable. 
 ... and train in decision-making and 
self-reliance 
They train in selfishness and 
decadence? 
 
This sort of evaluation is a major advance over looking only or overwhelmingly 
at the bottom left quadrant in the table: the potential economic virtues of a 
market system. It still has several major limitations. First, regarding what it 
looks at: we noted that capitalism is more than ‘the market system’. It is a 
particular sort of market system, centred on the prerogative of capital, and in 
practice marked by the power of vast accumulations of privately held capital. 
Some of the implications of this begin to emerge in the table’s assessment of 
weaknesses. Second, however, regarding how the table treats what it does look 
at: the table centres on proposed strengths and presents weaknesses mostly as 
counterarguments that set limits to the claimed strengths, rather than as 
independent primary considerations. Third, and central to this paper, regarding 
what the table fails to look at, by unthinking restriction within the categories of 
capitalism: it does not take up two key issues in the evaluation of capitalist 
systems and in understanding how capitalist systems evaluate: How is work 
treated? And is money income—even if it is maximised in a market system—
the predominant or even a major source of well-being? 
The Oxford Dictionary of Sociology to its credit proceeds to consider this third 
set of issues. Drawing on Robert Lane’s massive survey The Market Experience 
(1991), it remarks that welfare economics and economic policy arguments 
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typically make two fundamental questionable assumptions: that work is always 
a cost, and that money income is a major source of well-being. How much the 
mainstream economics themes above have to do with human flourishing 
depend on these two factors: 
 Firstly, the connections between human welfare and the maximization of 
the value of commodity production. Such connections are shaky (Easterlin 
2001; Gasper 2005, 2007a), as we touch on in the next part of the paper 
(Section III). In contrast, political arguments for markets need not make 
strong assumptions about such connections; they stress markets instead as 
channels for freedom, and as spaces to use one’s energies and ideas.  
 Secondly, the significance of work for our well-being. The standard 
economics literature makes relatively little reference to the status of work, 
and much of the literature implicitly focuses on markets rather than on 
capitalism in its entirety. Yet work is central to people’s lives. Given an 
activity-conscious conception of well-being, seen as well-living rather than 
as a mental-profit output category (but also without equating well-being to 
sheer activity, a conception we critically probe in Section IV), work should 
be central in discussion of capitalism and human flourishing. We will look 
at this further in Section V.  
3  Capitalism and the Conception of  Human Flourishing 
What sort of human flourishing does capitalism in reality 
further? 
The most summary and critical view that one encounters in response to this 
question is that under capitalism the meaning given to flourishing becomes: to 
flourish one’s possessions. Under this lies something deeper though: to 
flourish one’s possessions is to assert one’s importance, one’s success, one’s 
quality; even if at the same time this assertion sometimes aims and succeeds in 
diminishing other people’s importance. 
The most extensive and laudatory view is presented by Deirdre McCloskey 
– that capitalism can and generally does represent and fulfil the classical 
virtues. In between these extremes lie many more qualified positions, including 
historically specific positions, in the spirit of Albert Hirschman. Hirschman 
concluded in his Rival Views of Market Society—a work surprisingly not cited by 
McCloskey—that market activity both conduces to peace and order (the so-
called doux-commerce thesis) and to undermining its own moral foundations (the 
self-destruction thesis); and that where the balance lies in particular cases 
depends on many factors which require case-specific investigation. We find 
such investigation in parts of the literature of social history. Given the 
constraints of space and of my own knowledge, I will present some more 
generalized ideas that require historically specific exploration. 
Capitalist society may allow space for expression of all sorts of criteria, but 
which criteria predominantly drive or steer the system? For business decision 
makers, profit, and for present-day government decision makers, economic 
growth, are clearly major criteria. In both cases, forces of competition often 
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punish much divergence from the paths laid down by these criteria. Other 
criteria may be honoured in speech, but the racing train of capitalist society 
proceeds along tracks that may not allow them much weight in practice. In 
contrast to McCloskey, her sparring partner Arjo Klamer stresses in his book 
In Hemelsnaam! (In Heaven’s Name!) how the most important aspects of life, 
the most important criteria of life quality—such as family relations, friendship, 
mutual respect, ‘quality time’—are typically not measured in the ruling 
calculations in our capitalist societies.  
In terms of existing conceptions of well-being – pleasure or contentment, 
preference fulfilment, the fulfilment of substantive needs, and so on – it can be 
argued that capitalism does not fit any of them very well; for only preferences 
backed by money are referred to, and only in proportion to purchasing power. 
Capitalism’s motor of restless expansion and destruction may best fit an 
activist, productivist conception of well-being, or perhaps a Darwinist model. I 
will outline the arguments here, and then extend them to look more deeply at 
the activist conception and at its paradoxical counterpart, the low status of 
work in capitalist calculations. 
A huge body of research indicates that the domain of economic inputs to 
life which economics has studied in detail—resource holdings, income, 
expenditure—is relatively weakly connected to the domains of valued ends, 
whether we look at the domain of universally or authoritatively valued life-
functionings (such as longevity, mobility, low morbidity, autonomy and 
agency), which we may call ‘objective well-being’ (OWB), or at the domain of 
felt satisfactions, which we may call subjective well-being (SWB). Sometimes 
subjective well-being and objective well-being are not strongly connected to 
each other either. They clearly have partly different determinants, and both 
also depend in large part on factors other than economic inputs (Gasper 2005).  
Does income promote subjective well-being? There are different 
dimensions of subjective well-being. At minimum we must distinguish 
pleasure, contentment, and negative affect (cf. Lane 2000: 15), for the three do 
not always move in line. Even so, it reportedly appears workable in many 
contexts to use a composite of the three, or to prioritise the second, 
contentment. There are some disputes over what the evidence shows, 
inevitably, but also a remarkable degree of consensus about some main lines of 
what we know. The so-called Easterlin paradox is now widely accepted as a 
first approximation, even if there is dispute over the details: average subjective 
well-being increases markedly with income to an annual income levels per 
capita around $10-15K, markedly slows down thereabouts and thereafter and is 
virtually flat from $20K per capita or so. Some authors stress that certain 
studies show a still slight upslope at the higher income levels, while some 
others stress how slight is the upslope or find that it does not exist. 
Richard Easterlin himself, who highlighted the paradox back in the early 
1970s, is now even more sceptical (2005a, 2005b). He warns that typically ‘the 
diminishing returns generalization is based on data for a single point of time 
and on a simple bivariate comparison of happiness or life satisfaction with 
income without controls for other possible variables’ (2005a).  His deeper 
reading of the data, including time-series data, proposes that, at least from 
lower middle income levels, income has on average no significant correlation 
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with subjective well-being, let alone a significant causal contribution. 
Significance here means socio-economic significance, size of effect, and not 
statistical significance, closeness of correlation. 
Next, does income growth promote the components of objective well-
being? The evidence is sometimes yes, sometimes the reverse—for example 
because income-getting can compete away attention and resources from more 
important things—and sometimes that income is irrelevant. Life expectancy, 
health, and family relationships—core elements in most public specifications 
of ‘objective well-being’ and core determinants of most people’s subjective 
feelings of contentment—are as good or better in middle-income country 
Costa Rica than in top-income country the USA. 
I present the overall problematique in a ‘puzzle triangle’. The Easterlin 
paradox concerns the right side of the triangle and the very weak or negligible 
(time-series and cross-country) relation of income to subjective well-being after 
middle- or high-middle income levels. Easterlin himself holds, as we saw, that 
there is no reliable relation even at low-middle income levels. There are other 
factors which have notably more substantial favourable impacts on subjective 
well-being, including friendship, good family relationships and work felt as 
meaningful. 
FIGURE 1 
 The puzzle triangle (from Gasper 2005) 
 
 
 
 
The Sen paradox, if I may coin a term, concerns the weak relation in many 
cases between income and objective well-being. Expectations have not been 
met for the impact of income and consumption on many objective well-being 
dimensions, such as mental health; this concerns the left side of the triangle. 
Yet there are other factors which have substantial favourable impacts on 
aspects of objective well-being like physical and mental health, including again 
friendship, family relationships and work felt as meaningful. 
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The Easterbrook paradox, to coin a further term, concerns the weak 
relation of objective well-being to subjective well-being, at the top of the 
triangle, as presented in Greg Easterbrook’s book The Progress Paradox. 
Contributing to all the other paradoxes, the Schwartz paradox concerns the 
stresses and discomforts brought by ever widening ranges of required (or 
promoted) consumer choice, brilliantly explored in Barry Schwartz’s The 
Paradox of Choice – Why More Is Less. 
To explain this diverse and worldwide set of observations, one strategy is 
to look at the other inputs to well-being, besides income and wealth, and to see 
their degree of independent importance and the extent to which they may be 
competitive with market-mediated aspects. Many major aspects or 
determinants of well-being pass outside markets - family, friends, health, 
recreation, feelings of dignity. Non-market sources appear more important in 
general for happiness than are market sources. These non-market sources of 
well-being can be competitive with the market-mediated aspects. Jerome Segal 
and Robert Lane amongst others summarise much evidence that obtaining 
extra income and consumption can undermine or replace more rewarding 
routes, by undermining some aspects of objective well-being which contribute 
to subjective well-being, or some of the “other inputs” in Figure [1]; for 
example by undermining the quality (and quantity) of family life and other 
personal relationships (Gasper 2005). Lane hypothesises, for example, that 
materialism contributes to impoverishment of personal relationships, which in 
turn leaves people more emotionally vulnerable when they face difficulties. 
Amongst the market sources of subjective well-being, experiences during work 
hours or unemployment appear typically more determinant of personal 
satisfaction than is the level of income or consumption (see Gasper 2007b and 
literature cited there).  
The diagram represents paradoxes that arise with respect to the 
expectations of the ‘material welfare’ mainstream in economics (see Cooter and 
Rappaport 1984). The findings about sources of well-being oblige us to go 
back to reconsider conceptions of well-being that are conventionally applied as 
criteria of performance: the allocation of attention towards the outcomes of 
production and consumption, and away from the processes of work and the 
ongoing relationships to persons not only to things. 
The conceptions of well-being or flourishing 
Systematic thinking about conceptions of well-being intensified in the 1980s, 
partly in response to the lived experience of, and theoretical puzzlement 
around, these emergent paradoxes. The philosopher Derek Parfit’s book 
Reasons and Persons highlighted three conceptions, and facilitated discussion 
amongst economists and analytical philosophers: 
1. Well-being as Pleasure (and as avoidance of pain); this is a subjective well-
being conception, of hedonistic form; 
2. Well-being as Preference Fulfilment; and 
3. Objective list’ conceptions of well-being, which specify the components of 
or for a flourishing life. 
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Psychologists refine or extend the first conception. Hedonic psychologists 
distinguish contentment/satisfaction from pleasure, as an empirically 
distinguishable and independently varying form of subjective well-being 
(Kahneman, Diener, Schwarz 1999). Some other psychologists go further and 
present a eudaimonic interpretation of subjective well-being, which emphasises 
autonomy, competence and relatedness (Deci and Ryan 2001). For our 
purposes here we can remain with Parfit’s three headings, for the evidence 
reported on pleasure and contentment is apparently not widely different, and 
because the varieties of eudaimonic well-being conception appear to converge 
substantially with most objective-list conceptions, such as that for example by 
Martha Nussbaum. 
Amartya Sen extended Parfit’s list with three other conceptions: 
4. Opulence. In reality, instead of measuring pleasure, economists imputed it 
from the acquisition and control of commodities. 
5. Choice. Similarly, instead of measuring preference fulfilment, economists 
imputed that too, from choices: by the axiom of revealed preference 
whatever one chose was deemed to be what one preferred. Since the axiom 
is demonstrably wrong, it is better reinterpreted as representing a 
commitment to the priority of free choice: one’s well-being consists here in 
choosing freely, including freely making one’s own mistakes. 
6. Considered freedom. There is then space for a conception of well-being as 
informed free choice, or better, as in Sen’s own position, of well-being as 
access to outcomes which one has reason to value (the ‘one’ can also refer 
to a group). ‘Reason’ here implies decision that is wise as well as informed. 
So, many different ideas of well-being or human flourishing are present and 
advocated under capitalism. Which of these sets of ideas are promoted and 
encouraged by the operations of capitalism? Which of them then predominate 
under capitalism? And which variants of human flourishing are actually 
furthered by the operations of capitalism?  These questions could well have 
different answers. There may be a discrepancy between capitalist ideology—
what it says it does, what it says it values: freedom or utility or whatever—and 
capitalist reality, what it actually furthers and implicitly prioritises, which might 
be: activity. 
Mainstream economists have typically treated well-being as: pleasure, but 
operationalised as opulence; or secondly, as desire/preference fulfilment, but 
operationalised as free choice and in practice, thanks to a series of 
assumptions, further operationalised as income or, for a collectivity, as national 
income; and thus, implicitly, thirdly, well-being has been in effect interpreted as 
sheer activity—GNP was created as a measure of market activity not of human 
well-being. Activity must then be added as a seventh member of the list. 
Yet where does work figure in the list of conceptions of well-being and/or 
flourishing? It is prominent in many ‘objective lists’ and in the eudaimonic 
understanding of subjective well-being. Remarkably, it is little considered in 
some of the modern analytical philosophy literature on well-being. If we take 
two of the most highly used and praised books from the 1980s and 90s, James 
Griffin’s Well-Being and L.W. Sumner’s Welfare, Happiness and Ethics, their 
indexes make no mention of the topic of work. Much of the analytical 
philosophy literature grows out of a conversation with welfare economists and 
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is as prone to consumer bias as is mainstream economics literature. Where 
does work enter in the puzzle diagram? In one interpretation it is implicit, as 
negative income, with quality of work treated as an ‘other input’; or work as a 
whole is an ‘other input’. 
4 The lust for activity; when costs become benefits 
The bourgeois believed in the virtue of work, as against the aristocratic 
idealization of (genteel) leisure (Berger, 1987: 98). 
If activism is something we do not see in economic theory, but induce from 
economic practice, do we find it expounded and explored in other theory? Yes. 
We may have to look outside economics in order to explain the functioning of 
economies, and to use a historically aware conceptualisation of capitalism that 
incorporates non-capitalist elements, rather than only theorise about capitalism 
as an abstracted ideal type. 
Many authors, such as Max Weber, have argued that Reformation Europe 
saw ‘the revaluation of work as something worthwhile in itself’ (Hughes 2007: 
37). The primacy given earlier to vita contemplativa over vita activa was removed 
and reversed; absence from productive work became seen as idleness and 
failure to fulfil one’s duty. This applied to the capitalist, and to the propertyless 
labourer obliged to work for the capitalist. The paradox built into the system is 
that while it extols (putting people to) work, the felt content of the worker’s 
work time is of no independent significance – to the capitalist, whose 
perspective dominates. Only the output of the worker is accorded independent 
value, and ‘output’ here means market value – there is no other value seen in 
the process of production or the particular content of what is produced, 
whether pushpin or poetry or pornography. Unlike in a eudaimonic 
perspective which highlights a range of particular substantive excellences, the 
pure capitalist takes joy in one thing alone: endless monetary gain, even far 
beyond his ability to spend. Why? Weber, amongst others, considered that this 
could not be understood only in terms of the structural imperatives of 
competition, but required reference to factors beyond reason and calculation. 
For example, in ‘victorious capitalism…[in] the field of its highest 
development, in the United States, the pursuit of wealth, stripped of its 
religious and ethical meaning, tends to become associated with purely mundane 
passions, which often actually gives it the character of sport’ (Weber, 2001: 
123-4; cited by Hughes 2007: 60). 
The de facto preoccupation with activity arises for diverse reasons, for 
diverse groups. First, activity levels were easier to measure than were well-
being levels. Indeed well-being levels are not at all the same sort of entity, but 
are, despite the reified name, in fact evaluative judgements of a state of being. 
Their assessment requires valuation not only measurement.  
Second, typically it is politically safer to leave that door closed. To think of 
well-being levels in another way than as levels of monetized activity can open 
the door on the contentious processes of valuation that are implied. For 
politicians, activity levels are also easier to point to and influence.  
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Third, capitalist property relations and accounting mean that the capitalist 
reaps more profit from incessant turnover than from contented and replete 
customers: from built-in obsolescence of particular products, designed to break 
down after some years and to have spare parts no longer available, and from 
the cultural obsolescence of generic product-lines, displaced by continually 
generated novelty. Alfred Sloan of General Motors gave explicit formulation to 
the strategy of built-in obsolescence during the 1930s Great Depression. If 
instead capitalists owned all consumer durables and rented them to consumers 
they might have more financial incentive to ensure that the products do not 
break down or become unserviceable after a few years; but this would be 
effective only if they could earn more than by incessant generation of demand 
for new types of product. The tactics go hand-in-hand: the consumer is forced 
to buy not merely a replacement item but often a new ‘improved’ product-type, 
since the old one is no longer available or deemed respectable.  
These first three reasons all concern incentives for influential actors in 
capitalist society to focus on activity levels rather than any deeper notion of 
well-being. A fourth explanation is systemic: if competition is built in to 
capitalist markets then it drives new activity.  
A fifth reason, however, concerns a strand of thought and emotion that 
extols activity as indeed the relevant criterion of well-being. It connects to 
explaining capitalism’s frenetic activity by arguing that capitalism channels a 
range of deeper motives—an insight which is well understood and intensively 
used by business marketers. Adam Smith himself stressed that money’s 
frequent strength as a motivator rests not merely on its offering generalized 
command over commodities, but in addition because commodities are desired 
in major part as sources of identity, status, novelty, security and other forms of 
meaning (Hirschman 1977; Gasper 2004). In a more atavistic subset of this line 
of explanation, humans are considered to have a lust for activity. The drive can 
have either safe or destructive outlets. Hirschman shows how this view was 
prominent in 18th century writings: capitalism was considered to re-channel 
the angry passions, the passions that had devastated Europe in the 16th and 
17th century wars of religion and other civil and international wars.  
Probably all these explanations are needed, but the fifth is perhaps now 
least familiar and deserves further attention. It spans a variety of forms, many 
of which use a biological imagery that can fit better with the energy of the term 
‘flourishing’ than with the term ‘well-being’: people’s fulfilment and destiny is 
seen to lie in the furies of endeavour, for species, nation, or race. Nietzsche 
combined these sentiments in his dismissal of utilitarianism: ‘Man does not 
strive for happiness; only the English do that’ (1998: section 1.9). Man, real 
Man, strove for mastery, even world mastery. 
Not long after Nietzsche, and at around the same time as Max Weber 
lauded a similar arduous ethic of the quest for national supremacy (cited and 
discussed in Lichtheim 1972), an American leader spoke in these tones: 
I wish to preach, not the doctrine of ignoble ease, but the doctrine of the 
strenuous life, the life of toil and effort, of labor and strife; to preach that highest 
form of success which comes, not to the man who desires mere easy peace, but 
to the man who does not shrink from danger, from hardship, or from bitter toil, 
… 
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This was Theodore Roosevelt, in the opening paragraph of an astonishing 
speech from 1899 entitled The Strenuous Life. He continued: 
A life of slothful ease, a life of that peace which springs merely from lack either 
of desire or of power to strive after great things, is as little worthy of a nation as 
of an individual… [If a man] treats this period of freedom from the need of 
actual labor as a period, not of preparation, but of mere enjoyment, even though 
perhaps not of vicious enjoyment, he shows that he is simply a cumberer of the 
earth's surface, and he surely unfits himself to hold his own with his fellows if the 
need to do so should again arise. A mere life of ease is not in the end a very 
satisfactory life, and, above all, it is a life which ultimately unfits those who 
follow it for serious work in the world … (Roosevelt 1900, paragraph 2). 
Roosevelt was happy with a capitalism allied to militarism that pursued gain 
through non-market means too. He rejected the type of capitalism that 
replaced the passions by the interests and diverted men from war. He attacked 
as weaklings those who shrank from military intervention abroad because they 
preferred quiet money making—‘that base spirit of gain and greed which 
recognizes in commercialism the be-all and end-all of national life’—but he 
explicitly welcomed a strenuous capitalism as ‘one of the many elements that 
go to make up true national greatness’ (para. 3). The more strenuous the better, 
indeed, for great effort keeps one prepared for the great national and global 
challenges. By these he referred directly to matters such as the conquest of the 
Americas, contemporary challenges of seizing the Philippines and other 
remnants of Spanish empire, and ultimately ‘the domination of the world’ 
(para. 18). In this extreme variant of activism, acclaim for striving becomes 
acclaim for strife: ‘for it is only through strife, through hard and dangerous 
endeavour, that we shall ultimately win the goal of true national greatness’ 
(para. 18). 
One of Joseph Schumpeter’s insights from historically sensitive 
examination of capitalist societies was that they incorporate major residues of 
pre-capitalist formations and cultures, and, further, that these can be centrally 
important. Like Deirdre McCloskey he tended to blame non-capitalist strands 
for the problematic aspects of capitalist societies, but he was strongly 
analytically attentive to their presence. Raymond Apthorpe and I have 
described his views as follows: 
…in Schumpeter’s (1927, 1942, 1951) analyses of capitalist development, ‘true’ 
capitalism always tended to efficiency, prosperity and the reform and 
rationalization of its environment. The travail and conflict of early capitalism was 
due in part [he thought] to the presence of powerful groups derived from 
precapitalist eras. Likewise, the association of mature capitalism with imperialism 
and protectionism was not ‘from any tendencies of the competitive system’, i.e. 
not from ‘true’ capitalism in his opinion, but from its ‘distortion’ by these 
entrenched precapitalist groups to serve their own financial interests and atavistic 
ideologies. For Schumpeter this was ‘an historical observation, to his critics it 
seems a childish trick of definition’ (Stretton, 1969, pp. 119-120).  Finally, his 
predicted decline of capitalism, to be replaced by perhaps less rational and 
efficient forms of organization, was held again to imply no failing on capitalism’s 
part but in fact to indicate the magnitude of its successes, such that its inheritors 
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could indulge themselves in some novel and less demanding form of social 
organization (Apthorpe and Gasper, 1982: 655).4 
The theme of incorporation of powerful pre-capitalist forces in capitalism is 
strong in Hirschman’s work too, though in a different way. The market, 
believed Adam Smith and his contemporaries, had helped to control and 
replace the angrier passions by more reasoned, calmer siblings—‘the interests’ 
(Hirschman 1977: 28-43; Gasper 2004). Underlying capitalists’ storms of 
creative destruction were drives for meanings—for status, novelty and more—
that gave the search for economic gain its never-ending, never-satisfied 
impetus (Hirschman 1977: 108ff).  
Romantic and Counter-Enlightenment thinkers were not satisfied with 
this bottling up of the genie of passion in the engine-rooms of the capitalist 
system. By the late 19th and early 20th centuries, as we saw, various theorists 
and leaders had produced a Romantic stance now often fortified with 
Darwinist philosophy. Georges Sorel, Nietzsche’s near contemporary, was one 
who gave such leanings eloquent expression. He did so in ways partly similar to 
Nietzsche and Roosevelt, partly distinctive. In Isaiah Berlin’s words: 
Sorel was dominated by one idée maitresse: that man is a creator, fulfilled only 
when he creates…  He is, for Sorel, in the first place, a producer who expresses 
himself in and through his work, an innovator whose activity alters the material 
provided by nature…  History shows that men are essentially seekers not of 
happiness or peace or knowledge or power over others, or salvation in another 
life—at least these are not men’s primary purposes (Berlin 1981: 298-9).  
Man seeks to fulfil himself ‘in the imposition of his personality on a recalcitrant 
environment. … Man lives fully only in and by his works, not by passive 
enjoyment or the peace or security that he might find by surrender to external 
pressures, or habit, or convention …  [T]he true end of human life…[is] the 
effort to be and do something’ (ibid., pp.299-300). ‘Sorel, like Nietzsche, 
preached the need for a new civilisation of makers and doers’ (p.327). 
Sorel shared the image of Promethean capitalism drawn by Marx and 
Engels in The Communist Manifesto.5 From Marx he drew the conception of ‘man 
as an active being, born to work and create’ (Berlin 1981: 308). ‘Men[‘s] 
essence, for Sorel, is to be active beings…’ (p.303). Action is all: not reasoned 
prediction, which is impossible and in addition unnecessary since we have an 
evolved (or experience-gained) intuition; Sorel shared the Bergsonian belief in 
élan vital. Thus unlike Marx, Sorel demanded permanent revolution: we need 
unending activity, and revolution cleanses. Ironically, it is capitalism, history 
shows, which provides the permanent revolution. Sorel himself was anti-
capitalist, opposed to the alienations of commodity society. He had, says 
Berlin, ‘a Jansenist hatred of the twin evils of hedonism and materialism’ (p. 
300). Yet he admired the quest for riches as opposed to passivity and 
contentedness, and as exemplified by robust American business barons. His 
ideal was a heroic class of producers, steeled in the furnace of conflict. This 
                                                 
4 For an analysis of Schumpeter’s arguments, see Apthorpe and Gasper (1979), 
Section 6. 
5 I follow in this paragraph the account provided by Isaiah Berlin. 
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form of insurgent, vitalist, doer mentality can be part of various ideological 
stances. Its cult of action, of doers, of rooted men, as opposed to 
cosmopolitan administrators and manipulators, contained a Fascist potential, 
reflected in Sorel’s enthusiasm at the end of his life for Mussolini. One of 
modern capitalism’s triumphs has been to harness to the games of 
consumerism the angry avant-garde passions of minds like Sorel’s. 
As highlighted by Keynes, Hirschman and McCloskey, much of the actual 
operation of capitalist businessmen and even consumers can be described not 
as prudence but as animal spirits (McCloskey 2006: 433). It is strewn with 
errors, real or apparent. Cost underestimation is endemic.6  Some of the 
underestimation is deliberate, for market society generates incentives to 
manipulate its own categories, and some of it can be seen as an outgrowth of 
activism, as explored for example in Hirschman’s theory of ‘The Hiding Hand’ 
(Hirschman 1967; Gasper 1986). The active ‘sinking’ of project costs is one 
noteworthy aspect. More boldly, in higher levels of policy discourse, costs can 
become reclassified as benefits, badges of heroic commitment and identity, 
proof of the indisputable rightness of a commitment; the stigmata of struggle. 
The thrust for profits and economic growth under capitalism promotes, 
for sure, the personal goals of the rich and powerful. Part of GDP’s attraction 
to national elites is that it also reflects power over others: power of 
governments to acquire military capability; and power of elites to acquire 
property; some people’s power to be heard and to communicate, to manage 
the generation of information and steer the evolution of opinion (Gasper 
2007c). However, to explain the sheer force of this thrust and the way it holds 
sway across internally diverse societies, we need also the previously mentioned 
explanations of capitalism’s frenetic activity: that apart from the element of 
competition built into the system which spurs ongoing effort, capitalist 
accounting categories mean that the controlling agent’s profit comes from 
continual turnover and permanently generated dissatisfaction and obsolescence 
rather than from contentment and repose; and that the energy for the system 
relies on channelling and harnessing a range of deep motives, including some 
of the angry passions and lust for activity. For vitalist thinkers such as 
Theodore Roosevelt, Nietzsche or Weber, influenced by Darwinist 
conceptions of unending struggles for superiority, this frenetic activity could be 
seen as both inevitable and desirable. 
5 The Paradoxes of  Work 
Is work a cost? When and for whom? 
We should compare the activist strand in capitalist practice, and in corners of 
capitalist theory, with the normal presumption in capitalist society that work is 
a cost. This was highlighted and queried, we saw, by Robert Lane. The 
capitalist hires other people’s time, and that time must therefore be considered, 
                                                 
6 McCloskey cites Bent Flyvberg’s study of cost overruns in transportation projects 
(p.434) and some similar studies (p.435). For a parallel study of cost overruns in large 
dams in India, see Singh (1990). 
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by the capitalist, a cost. Indeed, if the work is alienated work it will probably 
feel like a cost, to the worker. The capitalist’s own time is, in contrast, typically 
treated as the expression of exuberant animal spirits, creative and enriching, as 
befits a master. So, built-in to capitalist social relations is the treatment of most 
work as a cost and, says Lane in The Market Experience, a subordination of the 
quality of work experience to the priorities of purchasers. When those market 
priorities are served by job enrichment, so be it; but when they are served by 
job impoverishment, job insecurity, and in the extreme by human trafficking 
and bondage, so be it too. Saunders’ apologia for capitalism acknowledges this 
structural weakness. In mitigation he argues that advanced capitalism’s high 
productivity and innovative technologies have increased opportunities for self-
fulfilment outside of paid employment, in increased and enriched leisure time, 
and notably in do-it-yourself work. This line of argument offers more 
consolation to a harried formal sector employee than it does to a dependent 
informal sector worker or a trafficked ‘illegal’. 
Yet well-being research, as we saw, indicates that employment is 
potentially and even frequently a major source of fulfilment. Csikszentmihalyi 
reports that on average, the people in various studies of American workers and 
managers in the 1980s had more rewarding experiences at their work than in 
their leisure. Work provided more occasions where people faced challenges, 
focused their attention, reached targets, matched their activities with their 
abilities, and grew as persons (2002, Ch.7; Csikszentmihalyi & LeFevre 1989). 
‘The Paradox of Work’, Csikszentmihalyi reports, is that, despite this, 
people want more leisure rather than more work (2002: 157ff). He examines 
first the possible explanation that people are near their limit of energies, but is 
sceptical. Instead, the issue is that work is felt ‘as an imposition, a constraint, 
an infringement of their freedom, and therefore something to be avoided as 
much as possible’. So even if ‘the momentary on-the-job experience may be 
positive, they tend to discount it’ (p.160). 
A sister paradox arises, concerning allocation of attention within the 
scientific literature. Quality-Of-Life studies consistently show that work and 
relations with other people are the key determinants of well-being 
(Csikszentmihalyi 2002:164). ‘Love and work’, remarked Freud. Despite this, 
work remains relatively neglected in economics, and what we called the 
capitalist perspective is thoughtlessly spread to new contexts. Saunders (1995: 
90) suggests, for example, that putting ‘all the emphasis…on the goal of 
monetary success while insufficient attention was paid to the normatively 
approved means for achieving it’ contributed to the major growth in crime 
rates in rich countries in the second half of the last century.  
McCloskey’s The Bourgeois Virtues makes an early affirmation of the 
bourgeois work ethic: ‘the common element in any bourgeoisie [is] the 
honoring of work apart from manual drudgery or heroic daring. … bourgeois 
humans [are] self-defining workers.’ Work is the path to autonomy, identity, 
and adulthood (McCloskey 2006: 75). But after these emphatic statements near 
the beginning of her systematic exposition, McCloskey leaves the subject of 
work as such untouched for nearly four hundred pages. She perhaps has 
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relatively so little to say on work and workers because her book is in reality 
more about markets than about capitalism as a whole social order.7 
The tyranny of capitalist accounting categories 
If consumption were the only end, and if production and exchange were only 
means to its achievement, certain rules about the optimum conditions of 
production and exchange could be laid down. The formulation of these rules has 
been the aim of an important branch of traditional welfare economics. But the 
disturbing fact is that neither the conditions in which production is carried on, 
nor the relationships generated by exchange are purely instrumental. They are 
human conditions, and human relations, which are valued as much as, and in some 
cases more strongly than, the end of consumption (Streeten, 1954: 365). 
Capitalist accounting categories have both virtues and dangers. The capitalist 
prerogative allocates surplus to a relatively cohesive and capable entity that is 
typically focused on investment and capital growth. On the other hand, these 
categories have led us into the lunacies of built-in obsolescence, for example. 
And capitalist market categories and formats have been, and increasingly are, 
extended from the level of the individual capitalist enterprise into other arenas, 
including the evaluation of community programmes and the evaluation of the 
performance and welfare of entire societies. Lifeworlds become invaded by a 
relatively primitive calculus from the world of business. The principle of 
discounting, for example, established to order the profit calculations of 
investors in impersonal markets, has become mindlessly extended to determine 
the fundamental societal issue of the relationship between the present 
generation and future generations. 
Let us take a related example. In evaluations of community programs, the 
treatment of volunteer time can be decisive. Howard Richards’s book The 
Evaluation of Cultural Action - An Evaluative Study of The Parents and Children 
Program (PPH) provides a case study of the central significance of how 
volunteer time is considered. In the PPH program in rural southern Chile, 
parents taught their own small children at home, after group meetings in which 
they themselves learned with the help of a volunteer coordinator and 
sometimes a paid coordinator. The program used a hypothesis of synergy 
between the three sets of activities: child education, adult education, and 
community development. The adult education component had to be left 
somewhat tacit, in order not to jeopardise parents’ self-respect and the 
children’s respect for them. The programme was ‘in order to show our 
children that we are people’ said a program participant (Richards, p. 19). But 
                                                 
7 She returns to the theme only on p.461, claiming extraordinarily that: ‘only the 
bourgeoisie thinks of work as a calling’, and that ‘Until the quickening of commerce in 
bourgeois societies, work except praying and fighting was despised’ (p.470). Yet on 
the next page she cites Lester K. Little as saying ‘The ideals of Christian society as 
formulated in earlier centuries [pre-13th] had come to include high regard for creative 
work, and so the problem of the legitimacy of the merchant’s activities generally, as 
well as of the profit he made, turned largely on the question of whether what he did 
could properly be considered creative work’ (cited by McCloskey p.462). 
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viewed from a market perspective, the program was deplorably profligate with 
its use of parents’ time. They were put to work in enormous numbers to 
produce very little, as measured in market terms. 
Richards asked: Is the PPH program more expensive or less expensive, 
per child taught, than kindergartens? The comparison was between PPH and a 
kindergarten in which a group of children receive basic instruction and 
supervision from a paid instructor. The key question was: Is volunteers’ time a 
cost? Everything hung on this. Using a very modest estimate of the money 
value of volunteers’ time, ‘PPH costs approximately four and a half times as 
much as kindergarten. … [Whereas] Making the same assumptions except for 
disregarding the money value of the time of volunteers, kindergartens cost 
nearly five times as much as PPH’ (Richards 1985: 46). 
Richards argued that volunteer time should not be considered as a 
monetized cost, and suggested that costing it monetarily—as some 
representatives of large international funding agencies insisted on—is ‘a 
metaphysical error’ (p.64), an error arising from the basic way one sees the 
world. As we noted, from employers’ perspective paid work is a cost; whereas 
some workers may feel work as a cost and others may feel it as a benefit. The 
choice can make an enormous difference in evaluation. Market-dominated 
thinking, imported into public policy and evaluation, assumes – often without 
argument – that public discourse must use the perspective of the capitalist 
employer.  
It may be argued by economists that volunteer time has an opportunity 
cost, in terms of efforts withheld from activities that would contribute more 
directly to economic production; or that, simply, work is pain. But sometimes 
the work is not viewed merely or primarily as pain but instead as personal 
growth, as opposed to economic growth; and the foregone economic 
production may be of little significance—to the people concerned—compared 
to the use of their time for interacting with their friends and loved ones. Work 
and love, said Freud. We should not presume that economic growth is the 
objective, nor automatically adopt the classification of costs and benefits that 
would be used by private sector business.  
Is perhaps the volunteer’s case a ‘special’ one, whereas in the ‘normal’ case 
of waged work there would be no danger of overestimating cost, given the 
expectation that if you enjoy, or cherish, your work you will accept less pay to 
do it, so that money costs will be lower? This is true in some vocations, 
including academe and the priesthoods. In places such as Kerala, educated 
young people certainly accept much lower pay in order to avoid the dishonour 
and disutility of manual labour in the rice field or the brick field as opposed to 
in the shop or the office. 
However, pay is not so flexible: remuneration is in large part to cover 
socially-determined subsistence needs, and pay levels are partly set to convey a 
social status. Work enjoyment, or lack of it, is not the only determinant of 
reward. An academic who might willingly work for relatively little is still paid 
fairly handsomely. More generally, the ‘decision utility’ expectations about 
work, in advance of doing it, may in various instances fall below the 
‘experienced utility’ from doing it, for reasons similar to in Csikszentmihalyi’s 
‘Paradox of Work’. Public expenditure choices could sometimes be distorted 
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by underestimation of the benefits in work, as well as by the subsequent 
attempts to massage calculations so as to compensate for the depressing effect 
on the benefit-cost ratio of the overestimation of social costs (as opposed to 
market costs). 
Rethinking Work 
How can we build-in alternative conceptualizations of work, as part of more 
adequate approaches to human flourishing? Let me suggest a few agenda 
points, around the general theme that work has to be rethought within the 
framework of well-living: as central to living and central to human flourishing, 
rather than as a tedious prelude to frenetic consumption. 
Two sectors of ‘work’ that are centrally important for thinking about 
human well-being and flourishing are domestic work and caring work. Yet 
such activity, key to human fulfilment as well as social reproduction, is liable to 
be ignored when not commodified. There are vibrant literatures, research 
programmes and social movements that attempt to redirect and restructure our 
attention to and in these two areas, as well as related broader thinking within 
feminist and Green circles, querying the categories of exchange economics.8 
While those areas are vibrant, within the literature on ‘human 
development’ the issue of work seems still relatively neglected. The potential is 
there. Manfred Max-Neef in his theory of ‘Human-Scale Development’ 
requires attention, in each of a series of life spheres, to dimensions of Having, 
Doing, and Interacting, and not only of Being. His ideas are used by some 
environmentalist and community development groups, but remain marginal in 
influence compared to the work of Amartya Sen. Sen has criticized several 
major aspects of the conventional economics conceptualization of welfare, but 
he does not appear to have directly queried the transplantation of market 
categories into societal decision-making, including the equation of work with 
cost. His elaboration of the case for a shadow wage, for instance, was based 
rather on the instrumentality for increasing net economic product of using 
lower-than-market wages in public expenditure decision-making. His 
subsequent discussions of the personal value of employment focus on the 
increased range of options a person has, in the context of intra-family and 
intra-group negotiations, more than on the effects of employment on a 
person’s skills, self-image or character. This latter direction of analysis provides 
a basis for a more adequate critique and for an alternative based on developing 
people rather than capital.  
Grounding the discussion of ‘human development’ more solidly in the 
rich and growing work on well-being should be the way ahead. From the 
empirically based well-being literature Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi’s Flow, for 
example, examines how fulfilment can be promoted in each area of human 
endeavour. He argues that well-being means making experience rewardingly 
meaningful, whether through restructuring the external situation or 
restructuring how we experience it. The important elements are: an ordered 
                                                 
8 An interesting example is the work of Genevieve Vaughan; see e.g. Vaughan (1999; 
n.d.). 
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mind (through the mobilization, steering and focusing of attention), a feeling 
of control, and a feeling of meaningfulness. Each of these requires skills, and in 
turn they build an enriched self. Lack of such autonomy is exploited by others, 
not least by the marketing divisions of capitalist corporations. The presence of 
such autonomy allows one, to use Csikszentmihalyi’s term, to achieve ‘flow’ – 
sustained flow of energies in furtherance of one’s goals without distraction or 
psychic disorder. Changed external conditions alone will not suffice for peace 
of mind. ‘Enjoyment’, in the sense of more than merely pleasure from 
fulfilment of biological needs or social expectations, comes through exercise of 
one’s skills in an activity that well matches and stretches one’s skills; that 
thereby fully absorbs one, through providing a real challenge that is yet 
manageable; and  that involves definite goals and direct feedback on progress 
toward them. The activity should be one that is perceived as independently 
valuable, not only instrumentally useful. Unfortunately some ‘flow activities’—
not least, war—can be instrumentally damaging activities. A focus on activity 
and work alone carries dangers, as the impending environmental crisis of 
industrialism shows. 
Contemporary capitalism requires a value transition, environmentalists 
warn. In the terms used by The Great Transition Initiative and the Earth Charter 
(Kates et al., 2006), we must move from the values of consumerism—salvation 
through buying—to a focus instead on quality of life; from individualism to 
human solidarity; and from domination of nature to ecological sensitivity and 
stewardship. This adds further dimensions to the historical scenario presented 
by Keynes, who sketched the transition required beyond the material chase 
once that era has completed its work in establishing a comfortable basis for 
living. We must move on to a greater concern with the contents of living. The 
same transition is expounded by Deirdre McCloskey’s associate and critic, Arjo 
Klamer (2005). In effect these authors advise that once we have reached the 
Easterlin plateau, upon which income growth brings no longer any significant 
benefit in terms of well-being, we need to reorient our societies away from the 
material chase. People are misled by ‘hedonistic disconnect’, the belief that we 
can get sustained happiness directly from things, with affluence not understood 
as a platform that allows experiences that can take us well beyond it, but 
instead assumed to be the end itself, where more is always better and never 
enough. Motivating such a move away from the material chase will require 
more than Csikszentmihalyi’s extension of the spirit of the master craftsman 
into all the activities of living. It will require connecting to the driving passions 
for action which have powered capitalism; including – a final agenda point for 
future examination – by linking also to the spirit of play. Work as discussed in 
this paper covers far more than paid work; family work, community work, 
work for a cause, are the stuff of meaningful and fulfilling living. 
6 Conclusion 
There is perhaps nothing more urgent, in a world increasingly driven by 
multinational corporations and the power motive that is built into their 
operations, than to articulate a set of humanly rich goals for development… 
(Nussbaum, 2006: 306). 
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I proposed that besides asking what is the impact of capitalism in terms of our 
preferred notions of well-being and human flourishing we should consider 
what ideas of the desirable the real practice of capitalism represents and 
encourages. To address this question well requires further historically specific 
examination, but I have suggested two important possible patterns: capitalism 
undervalues work and yet overemphasises activity, monetized throughput. 
These biases apply at levels both of theory and practice. We noticed for 
example how economics arguments for markets typically questionably assume 
that money income is a reliable major source of well-being, and that work is 
always a cost. 
This perspective is widely and often inappropriately extended into public 
policy discourse in capitalist societies. 
First, the undervaluation of work. Capitalism consists of much more than 
private property and a market system. It contains what we called ‘the 
prerogative of capital’, in which surplus remains with the owners of capital, and 
‘the perspective of capital’, in which hired work is defined as a cost. Well-being 
research shows us how central is interesting and respected work, both for felt 
well-being and, through its contributions to physical and mental health and 
capability, as a socially recognised component of ‘objective well-being’. This 
theme is evident in the hedonic strand of research on subjective well-being, but 
is examined more deeply in the eudaimonic tradition of thinking about well-
being, which gives more attention to meanings. Thus while the modern 
concept of well-being provides a great advance over notions of ‘utility’ and 
‘economic welfare’, the concept of ‘human flourishing’ is better: it is more 
activity- and process-oriented, and less prone to being reduced to a single 
supposed essence. 
Second, preoccupation with monetized activity arises as a different effect 
of capitalist categories of social accounting. Ongoing profit relies on unending 
turnover, which is further fanned by competition. Modern capitalism’s 
mechanisms of built-in obsolescence and engineered dissatisfaction drive the 
never-ending activity. This preoccupation with increasing the supply of 
commodity inputs to being does not fit well any of the conventional academic 
conceptions of well-being, and implies instead an activist conception and 
perhaps a Darwinist model. It is an aspect of the particular ways in which 
capitalism channels deeper human motives and has incorporated pre-capitalist 
forces. Non-abstracted views of capitalism recognise that capitalist systems are 
always mixed with other social and cultural patterns. 
Does the activist strand in capitalist practice and in corners of capitalist 
theory compensate for the ruling presumption in capitalist society that work is 
a cost, and thus in effect respects the evidence from well-being research that 
work can frequently be a major source of fulfilment? Perhaps to some extent. 
But it is an unsatisfactory, accidental and incomplete type of respect for work, 
smuggled in via waste and obsolescence, the constant generation of 
dissatisfaction and new vanities, encased in concern only with the saleable, and 
too readily married to ideologies of struggle and strife. 
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